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This article is concerned with the role of democracy in preventing terrorism, 
identifying and apprehending terrorists, and in minimising and alleviating the 
damage created by terrorism. Specifically, it considers the role of democracy as a 
resource, not simply a limitation, on counter-terrorism.1  
 
I am mainly concerned with the ways in which counter-terrorism is similar to 
more familiar forms of public policy, such as the prevention of crime or the 
promotion of economic prosperity, and so nothing that I say turns on being able 
sharply to distinguish terrorism from other bad things that democracies have to 
face. I will not, then, address the extensive debate on the best way to define 
terrorism.1  However, I assume that terrorists characteristically seek to terrorise 
people in order to secure their particular ends.  What forms that terror takes, 
what people terrorists seek to terrorise, and what ends terrorists seek to promote 
I assume to be indeterminate, open to change, and a matter for empirical 
investigation.  However, I take it that the IRA, Baader Meinhoff, the Red Brigade, 
as well as certain animal rights’ groups in the UK, and certain anti-abortion 
groups in the US, are examples of terrorist groups, and individuals. In short, I will 
be assuming that terrorism is principally characterised by the choice of means to 
given ends, rather than by the ends themselves, and that it is the choice of 
means, rather than the favoured ends, that makes terrorism so problematic from 
a democratic perspective.   
 
                                                 
1 Unfortunately, this paper was written before David Anderson’s review of British terrorism legislation 
(especially RIPA the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act), was made public. However, it can be 
accessed online at https. //terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk .  And for those who wish to 
follow some of the debate which it has occasioned, see ‘ “Undemocratic, unnecessary, intolerable”…The 
Official verdict on Britain’s state snoopers by John Naughton in13, June, 2015, available at 
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun13/david-anderson-qc-investigatory-powers-report     
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However good the goal, terrorising a population – whether or not this involves 
killing the innocent – is morally wrong and, from a democratic perspective, an 
abuse of power over the lives of others.  While the use of terror may indicate that 
the ends sought by terrorists are such that people cannot be expected to support 
them voluntarily, there is no justification for supposing that the ends of terrorism 
must be morally or politically unacceptable, simply because the means are both. 
It is a staple of ordinary life – not merely of philosophical examples- that people 
are sometimes unjustified in the means they use in order to accomplish perfectly 
acceptable ends.  So, the ends terrorists seek are, or might become, morally or 
politically acceptable without in any way altering our objections to the use of 
terror as a tool for promoting them.  
 
Before turning to the goals of counter-terrorism, and the role of democracy in 
achieving those goals, it may be helpful briefly to distinguish specifically 
democratic objections to terrorism from more familiar ethical objections to it.  
Most obviously, terrorism is generally wrong because it involves unjust killing, 
maiming and terrorising.  Utilitarians, for instance, will likely focus on the pain it 
creates in sentient beings (animal, as well as human); Kantians will likely object to 
the ways that terrorism treats people simply as means to other people’s ends, as 
though people are not also ends in themselves, however useful they may be to 
others.  These both strike me as persuasive objections to terrorism.  However, 
they are not intrinsically democratic – that is, they are the sorts of objections to 
terrorism you might make whatever your views of legitimate government. By 
contrast, the democratic objections to terrorism importantly turn on the unjust 
ascription of power over others implicit in terrorism.  Arrogation of such power is 
at odds with the core democratic idea that people are entitled to govern 
themselves freely and as equals. No government is entitled to terrorise its 
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citizens, whatever one thinks about the legitimacy of capital punishment. Nor is 
government entitled to exercise its powers arbitrarily, or in ways and for ends, 
that have not been approved by citizens or their representatives. There are, 
therefore, distinctive ethical objections to terrorism from a democratic 
perspective which are not reducible to, although consistent with, more familiar 
objections. 2 
 
A comparison may be helpful. “Outing” involves the dissemination and 
publication, without consent, of sensitive personal information in order to achieve 
some particular moral or political purpose.3  The typical case involves revealing 
that some well-known or influential figure is gay or HIV positive – but the fact 
that someone has cancer, that they had an abortion, were a victim of rape, that 
they were once communists, or worked for the secret service are also examples of 
the phenomenon.  Classic objections to “outing” involve claims that the relevant 
information is private or personal, and so should not be made public without 
consent; or that revealing this information is unlikely to achieve the desired ends, 
and may even prove counter-productive.  A natural Kantian objection would be 
that outing treats someone simply as a tool for other people’s purposes, and that 
this is morally wrong.   
 
These strike me as good objections to “outing” as a general matter, although 
they are not always persuasive.  However, these objections are rather different 
from the specifically democratic objection, which is to the arbitrary ascription of 
power over others involved in the practice.  Who decides to do the outing, who is 
chosen as victim, how the costs and benefits of outing are determined are all 
decided in ways that deny victims the ability to influence a matter that may have 
serious implications for their lives, liberty, social standing, their prospects of 
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employment, their marriage and the custody of their children. Nor of course, is 
there any scope for appeal, oversight or compensation implicit in outing, as 
usually practiced.4  The power involved, therefore, is fundamentally undemocratic, 
even if it is not absolute – or the power of life and death. 5So, while outing, like 
terrorism, may be successful in achieving ends that are morally good, and 
potential objects of democratic consent, the means used are unacceptable and at 
odds with the reasons to value democratic government.  
 
The Goals of Counter-Terrorism 
 
I take the goals of counter-terrorism centrally to involve the prevention of 
terrorism, the identification and capture of terrorists, and the minimisation and 
alleviation of damage from terrorism. These are scarcely the only goals of 
counter-terrorism, but I imagine that these must have a central place in 
democratic responses to terrorism, whatever the case with other political regimes.  
 
If these are the central goals of counter-terrorism, then the origin of terrorism 
(whether it is home-grown, imported or some combination of the two) is 
irrelevant to the legitimacy of the goals, though it may matter to the means used 
in realising them. Moreover, the goals of counter-terrorism are importantly 
similar to those characteristic of other forms of public policy, which typically seek 
to minimise or prevent the occurrence of bad things –whether or not the causes 
are human or intentional.6 
 
The goals of fighting terrorism are importantly similar to the goals involved in 
fighting crime and, more generally, to the goal of preventing non-criminal 
sources of harm. So, many of the resources and constraints typical of these other 
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cases will be useful and important in the case of terrorism – in part because the 
differences between terrorism and organised crime may be hard to determine 
(especially because terrorists are likely to fund themselves through various 
criminal activities)2 and because the terror created by some diseases when first 
discovered (cancer/AIDS) or by certain events (floods, famines, eclipses, economic 
depressions) are all susceptible to manipulation by the unscrupulous for their 
own purposes. The source and particular character of the terror, therefore, does 
not matter to the legitimacy of trying to prevent it, to minimise the harms created 
by it, and to identify and apprehend those who seek to promote and to benefit 
from it. Finally, rehabilitation and not just punishment, may be a legitimate goal 
of counter-terrorism and, in some cases, may be obligatory, because the moral 
horror of an act does not automatically transfer to the person who committed it, 
as is clear from the case of child killers.  
These theoretical points have practical relevance to counter-terrorism. It is likely 
that fairly long-running terrorist organisations will have members who ‘want out’ 
or who, with a little persuasion, can be brought to envisage and desire an 
alternative way of life.  Handling such people involves complex moral, as well as 
practical, judgements about the appropriate punishment for their acts; the 
appropriateness of promising immunity from that punishment; and the 
appropriateness of demanding their active participation in the fight against their 
former comrades. Fear of public hostility to anything that looks like being ‘soft on 
crime’ – let alone ‘soft on terrorism’ – may well hamper efforts to be open about 
the bargains/promises made to former terrorists and  to use the promise of 
                                                 
2 The fact that terrorist organisations are often engaged in racketeering, for example, underpins 
controversies about ‘collusion’ in Northern Ireland and Massachussetts, where police and security agents 
often engaged in illegal activities that were hard to control.  Sir David Omand raises this issue clearly at p. 
10 in ‘The National Security Strategy: Implications for the UK Intelligence Community’, a discussion 
paper commissioned and published by the Institute for public Policy Research, in the UK, in February, 
2009.  Sadly, this paper is no longer available from the IPPR website, but I have a copy on file,.  
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rehabilitation and/or immunity from punishment as an inducement to desist from 
terrorism. Security forces therefore become vulnerable to the charge of acting 
illegitimately (undemocratically) and immorally if and when their bargains come 
to light.7These are real practical handicaps in counter-terrorism, as in efforts to 
diminish crime more generally.  They arise from mistaken views about the nature 
of moral responsibility, desert and punishment; and it is as important to counter-
terrorism, as it is to other public-policy objectives, to counter these.  As we will 





Democracy has many forms, but its key feature is that citizens are entitled to 
participate in government – in formulating, executing and judging matters of 
public policy – and have intrinsically equal claims to do so.  This claim to 
participate is different from the idea that citizens are entitled to be consulted by 
those who have responsibility for government – an ideal that characterised the 
medieval conception of kingship, for example.  It is also different from the idea 
that governments should consider people’s interests equally, or ‘govern in the 
interests of all’.  Attractive and important though these political ideals may be, 
they do not imply that ordinary people are entitled themselves to hold positions 
of public power and responsibility and, therefore, to do the consulting, 
considering and governing themselves, or through agents who they have 
authorised.  
 
Of course, there are different ways of ensuring democratic participation, and 
different ways of interpreting the ideal itself. However, a common feature of 
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these is that people have moral and legal rights, liberties, opportunities and 
resources to enable them to participate in politics freely and as equals. These 
rights, liberties, opportunities and resources structure the competitive aspects of 
politics so that winners and losers are capable of, and motivated to seek, 
cooperation in future.  In short, in (modern) democracies winners do not ‘take all’; 
losers ‘live to fight another day’; and words, arguments and dialogue, rather than 
force, intimidation and exclusion are the main tools of competition, as of 
government itself.8  This helps to explain why religious, civil and personal liberties 
are so critical to democratic government, even when they seem to be apolitical 
or, even anti-political, and why their content and justification from a democratic 
perspective may be rather different from those characteristic of liberalism, even in 
its egalitarian forms.9   
 
For example, the point of protecting privacy, from a democratic perspective, is 
not that privacy is some pre-eminent individual good because of its connection 
to human dignity, intimate and familial relationships or to property ownership – 
as it would be from liberal perspectives.  Privacy may, or may not be justified on 
these grounds.  The point, rather, is that protection for anonymity, confidentiality, 
seclusion, and intimacy – to name a few characteristics of privacy – helps to foster 
the freedom and equality necessary for democratic politics, by structuring and 
limiting competition for power in ways that enable people to see and treat each 
other as equal despite incompatible beliefs, interests and identities. Although 
there is likely to be considerable overlap between democratic and liberal 
accounts of people’s rights to privacy – especially when we consider the more 
egalitarian forms of liberalism associated with John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin  or 
Thomas Nagel – these are not going to be identical and there is no reason, off 
hand, why democratic ideas of privacy should be closer to liberal ones than to 
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utilitarian, Marxist, communitarian or feminist ones – which typically accord less 
importance to individual self-expression, sexual and romantic fulfilment, or to 
private ownership than liberals. 10 
 
The relevance of these points to counter-terrorism is that democratic government 
is not the same as liberal government or, even, constitutional government, 
although many forms of democracy are liberal, (in the sense that they place a 
premium on individual rather than collective goods and rights) and are 
constitutional, (in that deciding upon, judging and carrying out formal laws is the 
preeminent way in which collectively binding decisions are made – by contrast to 
the more informal and ad-hoc ways in which people often govern themselves). 
 
  It is only comparatively recently that philosophers have really started to probe 
the differences between democratic and allied moral and political ideals – in 
particular, the differences between democratic and liberal egalitarian ideas about 
people’s rights, values and claims on scarce resources. It is therefore difficult to 
provide simple and concrete examples of the significance of these differences for 
counter-terrorism.  The point, rather, is to be aware that liberal objections to 
wire-tapping, for example, may be rather different from democratic ones- so 
what would be unjustified from one perspective is not necessarily unjustified 
from the other.  This is partly because the considerations determining what is and 
is not justified can differ – as we have seen – but partly that what counts as an 
invasion of privacy (whether justified or not) may be rather different in the two 
cases.   
 
For example, liberals tend to think that there is something especially bad about 
constraining sexual and religious expression, compared to scientific or military 
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expression.11  This shapes their understanding of people’s claims to secrecy in 
sexual and religious matters, compared to economic and scientific ones – where 
companies, for example, are typically accorded considerable freedom to 
determine what is secret and to deny their employees privacy, and in military 
matters, where the government is given a fairly free hand. 12 
 
 It is unclear that we should accept these sorts of priorities – however familiar 
they may be – if what we are concerned with is the distribution of power 
amongst individuals.  Hence, the importance we should attach to differences 
between various techniques for surveillance – CCTV cameras compared to 
policemen, say- and to their location in pubs and shops, not just train stations 
and airports.  These differences may not be particularly significant from a liberal 
perspective, in so far as surveillance here can be described as occurring in public 
places, accessible to all, rather than in domestic or intimate settings. However, 
they may matter a great deal from a democratic perspective. These different 
tactics and locations of surveillance suggest rather different ways of distributing 
security and liberty amongst individuals and of conceptualising the good of 
security itself. So, the differences between democratic and liberal approaches to 
privacy can affect the ethics of counter-terrorism, and of security more 
generally.13 For instance, the differences between racial profiling, random 
searches and universal searches shows that there are very considerable moral and 
political differences in the way we can scrutinise and monitor each other.  Racial 
profiling places the burdens of collective security primarily upon a disadvantaged 
social group, and is likely, as well, to exacerbate unjustified prejudices and 
hostility.  As this is not true either for random searches or for universal ones, 
racial profiling is much harder to justify than these other forms of security.14  
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Likewise, the differences between a uniformed police presence, CCTV and a bus 
conductor or bathroom attendant are important to the justification of security in 
public places, and the justification of the one does not automatically mean that 
we should accept the others. The disadvantage of CCTV relative to a visible, 
uniformed police presence, for example, is that it provides no one who can come 
to our aid and, depending on how likely we are to forget that it is there, and how 
impetuous we are, it may do little to prevent crime.  The prime uses of CCTV, 
therefore, are likely to be in the post-hoc identification of criminals, whereas 
deterrence as well as solidarity may be better fostered by the presence of 
identifiable people who are able to provide some oversight of public areas, even 
if they are also engaged in other tasks.15   
 
People have privacy interests in public, then, which we can provisionally define as 
interests in anonymity, seclusion, confidentiality and solitude.  These are morally 
and politically important, even though it is unreasonable to demand the same 
degree of protection for our privacy in public places, to which all have access, as 
in areas where we are entitled to exclude others.16 Privacy in public places, such 
as parks, streets, museums, cinemas, pubs matters because many of us live in 
such crowded conditions that public space provides some of our best chances for 
peace and quiet, for a heart-to-heart with friends, or for relaxation and fun.  
 
 It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose that people lack legitimate interests in 
privacy once they leave their houses, or to suppose that privacy on public 
transport, the park or, even, at work, is a contradiction in terms simply because 
these are all areas in which others may see us, overhear what we say, or bump 
into us without violating our moral or legal claims to privacy.  After all, being 
snooped on and overheard by a passer-by are not the same, nor does groping on 
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the subway seem any more morally acceptable than at a cocktail party.  It is 
therefore important, when thinking about security, to consider the differences 
between our privacy interests in public – our interests in anonymity, seclusion, 
confidentiality and intimacy, for example – and their implications for the different 
forms of surveillance, if any, which may be justified.   
 
A few years ago, for instance, some police forces in the UK attempted to force 
pubs to install CCTV on their premises, as a condition for getting or retaining 
their entitlement to serve alcohol.17 Now alcohol clearly exacerbates tendencies 
to violence and aggression, and may make it easier for people to steal other 
people’s property, and to deceive or coerce them.  But to insist on treating all 
pubs as though they are the same is to ignore the differences for both privacy 
and security of small pubs, where people regularly meet and know each other, 
and the large, anonymous drinking places increasingly found in bigger cities.  The 
threats to security posed by the former are very much smaller than the latter, and 
the intrusion on privacy created by CCTV may well be much greater, because of 
the greater degree of intimacy and informality characteristic of such settings.  In 
short, the costs to privacy of surveillance are likely to vary even within spaces that 
are characteristically thought of as public.  
 
We should therefore be wary of ignoring people’s interests in privacy on the 
internet, including in areas of the web which are open to all, rather than ‘closed’ 
or part of recognisably private conversations.  Clearly the web, like the street, the 
park or the cinema, cannot be exempt from police scrutiny, nor can it be off-
limits to social researchers.  However, just as our privacy interests in parks, 
cinemas, streets and pubs are more complex and diverse than is often assumed, 
so our privacy interests in public communications, including on the internet, 
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cannot be simply divided into a public area – where police scrutiny or social 
research is assumed to pose no problems – and a private area where complex 
legal safeguards are supposed to be required before we are subject to such 
scrutiny.  If we would be troubled by the routine presence of unidentified police 
officers in health-clinics or public libraries, we should be uncomfortable with the 
suggestion that no special justification or supervision is required for police 
scrutiny of, and participation in, debates on public websites.  
 
 A uniformed police presence, for example, might inhibit us from picking up the 
information pamphlets on sexually transmitted diseases discretely available in the 
health clinic or seeking information about cancer or drug addiction in the library.  
But official surveillance that we do not know about leaves us vulnerable to 
misinterpretation of our thoughts and actions as well as to the misuse of state 
power. Once widespread, it creates a climate in which we are encouraged to see 
others as threatening, and ourselves as powerless and defenceless individuals.  
Surveillance can adversely affect the quality of our social relations and our 
subjective sense of ourselves, then, as well as our objective capacities to shape 
our own lives, whether we are concerned with places that are open to all, or those 
in which we are able to seclude ourselves.  
 
Democracy As a Constraint in Counter-Terrorism 
Democratic principles are a constraint on the ways we can respond to 
terrorism, just as they are to the ways we can fight crime, promote economic 
growth, or secure peace, love and happiness at home and abroad. These 
constraints are partly institutional and partly created by the moral and political 
considerations which justify democratic institutions.  There are two main ones I 
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want to highlight here, in part because they tend to be short-changed in the 
more familiar discussion of the ways liberty conflicts with security, or with 
efficiency.  The first concerns the relationship amongst different liberties, rights 
and opportunities; and the second concerns the way we conceptualise and 
distribute the costs and benefits of security.  
 
Privacy v. Security? 
As we have seen, it is not possible sharply to differentiate political and non-
political rights, liberties and opportunities – or constraints on religious freedom, 
sexual equality or freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and rights to 
vote, stand for election to government, or to dissent from the political choices, 
associations and actions of others. We cannot sharply differentiate political and 
non-political liberties and rights partly because the political consequences of 
curtailing any particular liberty are hard to predict and because democratic 
politics cannot be neatly cabined in Parliament, or its regional equivalents, and 
limited to the choice of legislators every few years.  
 
Constraints on privacy are necessary to protect ‘the rule of law’, because we 
cannot form, pass, judge and execute laws democratically without devices such as 
the secret ballot, or legal rights of confidential judgement, information and 
association, which enable people carefully to explore alone, and with others they 
know and trust, what they should do as citizens.18 Our legitimate interests in 
privacy are not negligible, or inherently of lesser importance than our interests in 
security.  Nor are they always selfish or self-regarding.  The latter assumption, I 
suspect, often underpins ideas about the lesser importance of privacy relative to 
other things.  But a moment’s reflection reminds us of the importance of 
confidentiality to our ability to keep other people’s secrets, even when it might 
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be in our personal interests to disclose them; and of the importance of 
anonymity, solitude and confidentiality to our abilities to act with tact, discretion 
and consideration for others, even when we do not share their particular 
sensibilities, interests and commitments. Just as our willingness to grant privacy 
to others can reflect respect and trust - and be valued and desired for that reason 
– so our willingness to act anonymously, confidentially or discreetly can reflect a 
mature and considered decision to avoid burdening others with our problems, or 
to avoid forcing them to confront features of the world with which they may be 
unwilling or unable to cope.  
 
Our interests in privacy, then, can be varied and inescapably tied to our sense of 
ourselves as moral agents.  They are not, therefore of obviously lesser importance 
than our interests in self-preservation – individual, or collective.3  This is partly 
because our interests in privacy are not purely instrumental but seem sometimes 
to be ways of affirming, even constituting, ourselves as people to be trusted, 
respected, deserving of liberty, equality and happiness.4 Indeed, while privacy can 
be necessary to our security and be desired for that reason, people are 
sometimes willing to risk their lives and health in order to maintain anonymity, 
seclusion and confidentiality.  This would be unreasonable were privacy less 
important than security but if, as I have suggested, it is inseparable from 
relationships and ideals that have ultimate value, then a willingness to risk 
physical security for privacy can be comprehensible, and even admirable.  
 
                                                 
3 Hence I disagree fundamentally with Kenneth Himma, in this volume.  
4 Benjamin Goold makes a similar point in his excellent ‘Privacy, Identity and Security’,  in B.J. Goold and 
L. Lazarus, Security and Human Rights, (Hart Publishing Company, Oxford 2007), ch. 3, where he shows 
how the effects of automated surveillance in the wake of 9/11, have exacerbated the threats to ‘narrative’ 
forms of identity, and their replacement by ‘categorical identities’.  
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Not all arguments for limiting privacy in the interests of security are consistent 
with democratic principles, or with the ways in which privacy can express our 
collective, as well as individual, interests in freedom, equality and solidarity.  We 
should therefore be wary of ‘ethical guidelines’, such as those propounded by Sir 
David Omand, which assume that whenever it is impossible to protect both 
privacy and security, the former should bow before the latter.19  .  Omand’s 
‘ethical guidelines’, which appear to be drawn from just war theory,20 are meant 
to tell us when the state is entitled to limit people’s privacy in the interests of 
security.  They include ‘sufficient sustainable cause; integrity of motive; 
proportionate methods; proper authority; reasonable prospect of success; no 
reasonable alternative’.  Such guidelines ignore the ways in which privacy can be 
necessary to the security of at least some people, given prejudice, discrimination 
and unfounded fear and hostility.  In addition, they overlook the ways in which 
democratic government and principles depend on our willingness to constrain 
the quest for security in the interests of the privacy of members.  In short, one 
worry about Sir Omand’s pronouncements are their one-sided and unqualified 
character, which turn a problem in jointly protecting two values into a reason to 
sacrifice one to the other.  This is unjustified, and has the predictable 
consequence that some people’s security will be threatened because we are 
contemptuous of their privacy.     
 
The US Supreme Court decision in NAACP v. Alabama (357 US. 1958) is 
interesting in this context.  The NAACP is the National Association for the 
Advancement of Coloured People, and was originally founded as a non-profit 
membership association.  By 1957 the state government of Alabama was 
seriously concerned with its growing membership and use of civil disobedience 
against racial segregation. The state government therefore sought access to the 
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membership list of the NAACP under an existing state statute aimed at ensuring 
that business associations be held responsible for any damage to life, liberty or 
property that their activities cause.   But while the Court accepted that the 
government of Alabama had a legitimate interest in ensuring that associations, 
like individuals, can be held accountable for harm to others, it denied that this 
required them to have access to the full membership list of the NAACP, rather 
than to the names and contact information of its leaders.  Freedom of 
association, the Court argued, is a fundamental democratic right, and protections 
for anonymity can be essential to its exercise.  So while the state has a duty to 
provide security for its citizens, the Court maintained that people’s interests in 
privacy and associative freedom legitimately constrain the ways that the state 
may fulfil that duty.   
 
According to Sir David’s guidelines, ‘integrity of motive’ is essential to determine 
when our interests in security justify curtailing people’s privacy by spying on 
them.  But this appears to confuse the conditions necessary for the state to be 
justified in exercising its rights of surveillance with the question of what rights – 
whether moral or legal - the state is entitled to claim.  At best, integrity of motive 
is relevant to the former, however as the US Supreme Court realise, in NAACP v. 
Alabama, it is irrelevant to the latter.  For example, the purpose of requiring the 
NAACP’s to disclose its membership list was not fear for people’s lives, liberty or 
property, so much as the desire to thwart the movement for Civil Rights. The 
motives for requiring the membership list in 1957, then, were not particularly 
reputable.  They would surely have failed Omand’s test of ‘integrity of motive’.  
Nonetheless, as the Court thought, democracy requires governments to be able 
to hold associations to account for their actions, and therefore to have some 
means of identifying their legal representatives, even if these do not require 
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governments to record the names, addresses (or the license plates and photos) of 
ordinary people, even if they are engaged in social protest, or campaigning for 
radical change.21 In short, Omand’s six criteria - ‘sufficient sustainable cause; 
integrity of motive; proportionate methods; proper authority; reasonable 
prospect of success; no reasonable alternative’ - provide guidance on the morally 
appropriate claiming and exercise of rights of surveillance.  What they do not tell 
us is tell us which moral or legal rights of surveillance follow from the state’s duty 
to keep us all safe.  
Equality 
Of course, we cannot always protect – let alone promote – the liberties and 
opportunities to which people are entitled. But if and when we can’t, it matters 
how the costs and benefits of any sacrifice are made in counter-terrorism, as in 
other aspects of public policy. In fact, I would suggest, it is necessary publicly to 
show that sacrifice x by group y is, indeed, necessary to prevent greater harms to 
some other group. Hence, it is necessary to discuss alternative ways of preventing 
harm, and how their respective costs and benefits are to be described and 
assessed.  
 
An example may be helpful, and can illustrate why talk of ‘proportionate’ 
sacrifices is often so empty and misleading.  In 2009 the part of London in which I 
lived –Streatham -faced the loss of its local police station, in the interests of 
efficiency and cost effectiveness, to some ‘central’ location somewhere else within 
the borough.22  The move might have been justified, although given the appalling 
traffic in London it is hard to be confident that shop-keepers, victims of domestic 
violence or young people would get the timely help that they need if they need 
to depend on help from outside the area.  But putting problems of response 
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times aside, if we consider that it can take an ordinary person anywhere from half 
an hour to an hour or more to travel 5-7 miles in that part of London, the 
consequences of such a move for democratic forms of policing and security 
become apparent.  After all, the point of police stations, from a democratic 
perspective, is not simply that they enable police quickly to get to the scene of a 
crime/potential crime, but that they represent the local community, and are a 
focus for local hopes, complaints, knowledge, pride and initiative.  This is scarcely 
possible if people have to find anywhere from an hour to three hours, in already 
busy lives, for a round-trip visit to ‘their’ police station.  
 
Thus, whether we are concerned with powers to stop and search, wiretap, detain 
without trial, to limit choice of religious dress, expression, travel and employment, 
it matters how we describe and assess the costs and benefits of our actions.  It 
matters, in order to avoid stigmatising minorities and unpopular social groups for 
what is, typically, the behaviour of a very small percentage of their population.  It 
is necessary to avoid cementing injustices and social problems – racial and sexual 
inequality, poverty, alienation, ignorance and hopelessness – that we already find 
it hard enough to deal with.  And it is necessary to avoid confusing democratic 




Before turning to democracy as a resource in the fight against terrorism, I would 
like briefly to suggest how the idea of democracy as a constraint on counter-
terrorism, and public policy more generally, may help us to handle the real and 
potential problems of suicide bombers.  
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I assume that an important goal of counter-terrorism is to move suicide bombers 
away from suicide, even when we cannot yet stop them planting/setting off 
bombs.  The parallel here is to the IRA – and the importance of getting advance 
warning that a bomb is about to go off, even when it is impossible to prevent the 
bomb from being planted and/or triggered. In each case, what is at stake is 
saving lives but also – and  importantly, from a long-term perspective - the ability 
to establish a relationship with bombers, however tenuous and difficult, in order 
to discuss alternative ways to achieve their ends, and different ways to think 
about those ends themselves.   
 
To do this it is essential that we can persuasively convey the message that the 
lives of suicide bombers are more valuable than they think; that they are valuable 
for reasons other than, or in addition to, those they believe; and that we 
recognise and care about their lives for reasons related to the reasons why we 
value our own, and that of our compatriots.  Put simply, we need to convey the 
message that we want them to desist from suicide, not merely from bombing; 
and that our objections to the latter – that this is a dreadful way to die; that 
nobody deserves such a death; that nobody is entitled to inflict such a death on 
others – are connected to our objections to their suicide and to those who have 
encouraged/persuaded/ordered them to die in this way.   
 
Of course, we are unlikely to be able to convey this message successfully in many 
cases; just as it is difficult to persuade some would-be bombers of the 
advantages of calling the police in order to avoid or, at any rate, to minimise 
death and injury.  But there are some people who can be persuaded or are, at 
least, credible targets of persuasion.  An important goal of counter-terrorism is to 
work out how to reach and influence these people.  However, the credibility and 
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practical effectiveness of our claims of concern and care – or of the effort to turn 
potential suicide bombers into negotiating partners – is the way that our society 
treats its own members, as well as foreigners.23  While it is clear that foreign 
policy has made Britain a target of Muslim ire, I think we also need to consider 
the ways in which our domestic politics prevent an adequate response to suicide 
bombers at home and abroad, and may even foster the belief that killing oneself, 
along with others, is necessary to manifest the sincerity and strength of one’s 
convictions, the urgency of one’s cause, and one’s claims to public attention. 
  
Democracy As a Resource in Counter-Terrorism.  
It is important to the motivation and justification of democratic government that 
people have some hope of influencing the political agenda on things that they 
care about. Where people have this sort of influence, democracies can 
accommodate the classic ‘single issue voter’ described by political scientists, 
whose views are organised around one particular issue, or set of issues – be they 
abortion, animal rights, global warming, self-rule for Ireland, Kashmir, Palestine.  
It is typically these people who are most readily alienated from democratic 
government, even though only a very small minority of those who are alienated 
will act out that alienation through politically motivated violence.  
 
Democracy offers the promise that losing on the swings (for example, on 
economic policy) is compatible with gaining on the roundabouts (for example, 
civil liberties or foreign policy).  So, while many people are not particularly 
enamoured of democratic government, let alone of their political leaders, they 
are unlikely to reject democracy as a means of handling political conflict.  This is 
less likely to be true for those with single-issue, non-negotiable causes, and this 
makes it a matter of some importance that people have multiple ways of 
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competing for political power and positions of public responsibility, so that 
failure in any one of these is less likely to determine failure on all.  
 
Making politics accessible to people in a variety of ways and through a variety of 
means encourages us to seek cooperative solutions to the realisation of our 
cherished ends, even when these are eccentric or unpopular. Political 
participation can help us to see why compromise is a legitimate response to the 
demands of others, and how to structure compromises that respect the sincerity 
and importance of people’s fundamental convictions, even when we cannot 
endorse them.  Engagement with democratic politics is not guaranteed to 
produce satisfaction and can, sometimes, be alienating and dispiriting.  But we 
are much less likely to be bitter and cynical about politicians as a class when we 
have tried our hand at politics; and we are more likely to accept the need to 
compromise in order to accommodate the interests of others when we have, 
ourselves, experienced the efforts of other people to accommodate our interests 
and concerns.  
 
If these points are right, the centralised, hierarchical and hide-bound character of 
British democracy – as of other well-established democracies – is a real obstacle 
to counter-terrorism. Democratic entitlements to welfare, education, employment 
and security imply rights to participate in determining what forms of these are 
desirable, how best to achieve these, and at what costs in terms not just of taxes 
raised and spent, but of opportunities foregone, and claims postponed or 
ignored. The real democratic agenda, therefore, is to improve people’s abilities 
and opportunities to debate their rights and duties, their liberties and 
opportunities, and the proper distribution of resources in matters of security, as 
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well as of education, employment and health, rather than to demand acceptance 
of a supposed code of ‘British values’ or of their equivalents, such as ‘laicité’24.  
 
There are many ways in which we might try to do this, and there is research on 
democratic budget-setting, prioritising of health-care needs, and jury 
deliberation – as well as on democratic deliberation more generally – which can 
be examined and built upon.5 How democratic deliberation is obviously depends 
on the way it is structured – what veto rights people have over discussion; what 
the terms of entry and exit are; what information is available to all, and what is 
secret; what sorts of coalitions are allowed and disallowed; who, if anyone, 
monitors or facilitates discussion.  All these are important, because deliberation is 
not always free and equal, let alone capable of generating more light than heat. 
 
Nor can all aspects of counter-terrorism be openly debated – though this, it 
should be said, is as likely to be true of economic and foreign policy as of 
counter-terrorism. Discussions may need to be confidential in order to facilitate 
the free and frank exchange of ideas – hence, in part, the ideal of cabinet secrecy. 
They may need to be limited in subject matter in order to avoid needless offence, 
or to enable people actually to sit down together.  And, of course, public debate 
sometimes has to be limited to protect people, institutions and facts of national 
interest.  
 
                                                 
5 See for example, Archon Fung, Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy, (Princeton 
University Press, 2004); Albert Weale, ‘Democratic Values, Public Consultation and Health Priorities’ in 
ed. A. Oliver, Equity in Health and Health Care, (The Nuffield Trust, London, 2004),   and Annabelle 
Lever, ‘Democracy, Deliberation and Public Service Reform: The Case of NICE’, in eds. Henry Kippin, 
Gerry Stoker and Simon Griffiths, Public Services: The New Reform Agenda, (Bloomsbury Academic 
Press, London 2013), 91 -106 
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But discussions of security can be useful even when they are based on historical 
cases, or on hypothetical ones. They can be comparative and quite general in 
focus – as when we compare attitudes to CCTV, ID cards, the storage and use of 
DNA samples, in Britain and other countries.  They can be useful when we 
consider how Britain differs from other democracies in its fairly extensive use of 
wiretapping for security and police purposes, but its unwillingness to allow that 
evidence in court6.  We can compare the treatment of gang members and the 
incidence of gang crime amongst children in Boston and Chicago, compared to 
London or Liverpool and its significance for racial profiling, for stop and search 
laws, and for the relationship between crime and terrorism.7 Above all, it is 
possible to help people to think about, and confront, difficult questions of 
identity, value and experience that are important to current efforts against 
terrorism, and that may be useful in considering what Donald Rumsfeld so 
memorably referred to as ‘unknown unknowns’.  
 
Take, for example, the role of Islam in Africa – in the conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia 
and Kenya.  Why not encourage Muslims in Britain and elsewhere to discuss the 
role of race in Islam, just as it is appropriate to ask Christians or Jews to consider 
the way it has shaped, and continues to shape, their theology, culture and 
politics? Why not have television programmes, newspaper and radio discussions 
on religion in contemporary Britain in which Asian Muslims and Christians from 
Africa and the Caribbean  - two of the livelier religious groups in our country – 
                                                 
6 For American scepticism about the benefits of their use of warrantless wiretapping, see the New York 
Times, (July 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/11/us/11nsa.html?th&emc=th.  Apparently, the 
very secrecy of the covert-wiretapping programme prevented the effective sue and dissemination of any 
information that it provided.  
77 See for example David A. Harris, Good Cop: The Case for Preventive Policing, (The New Press, New 
York, 2005) and his earlier Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work, (The New Press, New 
York, 2003).  
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discuss shared experiences of faith, racism, immigration and international 
concerns, as well as their mutual suspicions?   
These are merely examples – perhaps not good ones.  But they illustrate how 
narrow in structure and subject matter most contemporary debates on religion 
and security really are; how much we have to learn about people’s experiences of 
identity, religion and security; and how little we actually know about the sources 
of conflict and cooperation in our society.  
 
In short, democratic debate and choice are important weapons in the fight 
against terrorism. Democratic education and deliberation are necessary to the 
justification of any public policy on surveillance, although they do not figure in 
Omand’s ‘guidelines’ for legitimate surveillance.  Moreover, while governments 
and think-tanks stress the importance of education in fighting extremism, and in 
justifying surveillance, most proposals in this area are astonishingly bland and 
vague.25  Above all, they seem utterly disconnected from the thought that, as 
citizens, we need and are entitled intelligently to discuss government policy on 
surveillance, just as we would employment policy, education, welfare or policy on 
crime and punishment.  We may differ in our desire and ability to master many of 
the relevant details or controversies - though this is unlikely to be any truer of 
surveillance than of employment or education policy, let alone pensions or the 
EU constitution.   And some things have to stay secret.  We will therefore need to 
combine historical cases, the experience of other countries, and hypothetical 
examples, in lay as well as expert discussions.  But this is perfectly compatible 
with the assumption that ordinary citizens might be interested in, and should be 
able to discuss, the principles and basic practices of surveillance, as of counter-





I have argued that democracy is a resource, as well as a constraint, in the goals of 
counter-terrorism and suggested that the two are intimately related.  They are 
related in some of the same ways, and for the same reasons, that democratic 
government helps to prevent famine.  As Amartya Sen showed, in some of the 
work for which he won the Nobel prize in economics, democracies facilitate the 
effective use and sharing of information, as of other goods, because of the 
freedoms they secure. 
 
 Those freedoms come at a price and that price is not purely financial. It includes 
the death of people who would not have died, and might have had happier, more 
successful, lives under other forms of government.  In some cases, this is no 
cause for regret, because people are not entitled to secure their lives, liberty and 
happiness by enslaving others.  But matters are often more complicated, because 
people do not deserve to die or to be maimed because we may not inflict worse 
harms on others.  To say that democracy is a resource, not merely a constraint, 
then, is not to underestimate the latter. Instead it is to recognise that the 
dilemmas of counter-terrorism, as of public policy more generally, arise because 
the constraints of democracy are our resources for securing voluntary 
cooperation, even in the face of involuntary conflict. 
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See also Omand’s Securing the State, pp. 285-7 and 324-5 for repetitions of these 
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